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Abstract. The European General Data Protection Regulation defines
a set of obligations for personal data controllers and processors. Primary
obligations include: obtaining explicit consent from the data subject for
the processing of personal data, providing full transparency with respect
to the processing, and enabling data rectification and erasure (albeit only
in certain circumstances). At the core of any transparency architecture is
the logging of events in relation to the processing and sharing of personal
data. The logs should enable verification that data processors abide by
the access and usage control policies that have been associated with the
data based on the data subject’s consent and the applicable regulations.
In this position paper, we: (i) identify the requirements that need to be
satisfied by such a transparency architecture, (ii) examine the suitability
of existing logging mechanisms in light of said requirements, and (iii)
present a number of open challenges and opportunities.
1 Introduction
The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and Articles 12-
15 in particular, calls for technical means to support the obtaining of explicit
consent from data subjects and the provision of transparency with respect to
personal data processing and sharing. In order to provide said transparency,
companies need to record details of personal data processing activities and per-
sonal data transactions (i.e. who shared what data with whom, for what purpose
and under what usage conditions). From a technical perspective there is a need
for a transparency architecture that records metadata (i.e. policies, event data,
context), that can be used to verify that data is processed according to the
wishes of the data subject and the applicable regulations.
From a high level perspective such a transparency architecture needs to en-
able: (i) data subjects to verify that data processors are complying with usage
policies; and (ii) data processors to demonstrate that their business processes
comply both with the policies accepted by the data subject and the obligations
set forth in the GDPR. As a first step towards realising this goal, in this position
paper, we examine the suitability of existing logging and transparency mecha-
nisms as the basis for developing such a system. There exists a variety of logging
mechanisms that either represent events in local logs [2, 7, 10, 14, 15], in global
logs entrusted to one or more third parties [1, 6, 11, 12], or distribute event
logging across a number of peers [16, 19, 21]. Ideally it should be possible to use
some of these logging mechanisms together with access/usage policies in order to
automatically verify compliance of existing business processes with the GDPR.
The contributions of the paper can be summarised as follows: we (i) identify a
list of requirements relevant for transparent processing and sharing of personal
data; (ii) examine the degree of support, with respect to said requirements, of-
fered by the different logging architectures (i.e. ledgers); and (iii) discuss the
open research challenges and opportunities.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the
requirements that are relevant for data usage transparency frameworks. Sec-
tion 3 identifies a number of candidate approaches and examines their suitability
in terms of support for the identified requirements. Section 4 points to several
Resource Description Framework (RDF) vocabularies that can be used to repre-
sent data processing and sharing events and highlights a number of open research
questions. Finally, we present our conclusions and some interesting directions for
future work in Section 5.
2 Data Processing Transparency Requirements
Before discussing the different logging architectures (i.e. ledgers) we first provide
a concrete motivating scenario and identify several data processing and sharing
transparency and robustness requirements.
2.1 A Motivating Scenario
Sue buys a wearable appliance for fitness tracking from BeFit. She is presented
with an informed consent request, comprised of a data usage policy that describes
which data shall be collected, and how they will be processed and transmitted
in order to give her fitness-related information. The policy says that the device
records biomedical parameters such as heart rate; these data are stored in BeFit’s
cloud; and processed for two purposes: (i) giving Sue feedback on her activity,
such as calories consumption; (ii) (optional) creating an activity profile that will
be shared with other companies for targeted ads related to fitness. Sue opts
in for (ii) in order to get a discount. The usage policy, signed by both Sue
and BeFit, is stored in a transparency ledger. After one year, the device stops
working. After two years, Sue starts receiving annoying SMS messages from
a local gym that advertise its activities. Fortunately, all the data collection,
processing, and transmission operations have been recorded in the transparency
ledger. By querying the ledger, Sue discovers the following facts: (i) the gym has
an activity profile referring to Sue, that due to the appliance’s malfunctioning
reports that she is not doing any physical exercise; (ii) the gym received the
profile from BeFit, associated with a policy that allows the gym to send targeted
ads to Sue based on the profile; (iii) BeFit built the profile by mining the data
collected by the appliance; and (iv) all these operations are permitted by the
consent agreement previously signed by Sue and BeFit. Using the information
contained in the ledger, BeFit and the gym can prove that they used Sue’s
data according to the agreed purposes. However, Sue can now ask both BeFit
and the gym to delete all of her data. The information contained in the ledger
indicates precisely which pieces of information she is referring to, so they can be
automatically deleted in real time.
2.2 Ledger Functionality and Robustness
In order to enable scenarios such as that described above and to provide the
technical basis for companies to demonstrate that their business processes com-
ply with the consent, transparency, rectification and erasure obligations specified
in the GDPR, a fundamental first step is to create a ledger of all data transac-
tions (i.e. who shared what data with whom, for what purpose and under what
usage conditions) and to record what happened to the data (e.g. processing,
anonymisation, aggregation). In order to provide transparency with respect to
data processing to the data subject, while at the same time allowing companies
to demonstrate that they are complying with the regulation the following core
functions are required.
Ledger functionality
Completeness: All data processing and sharing events should be recorded in the
ledger.
Confidentiality: Both data subjects and companies should only be able to see
the transactions that involve their own data.
Correctness: The records stored in the ledger should accurately reflect the pro-
cessing event.
Immutability: The log should be immutable such that it is not possible to go
back and reinvent history.
Integrity: The log should be protected from accidental and/or malicious modi-
fication.
Interoperability: The infrastructure should be able to transcend company bound-
aries, in the sense that the data subject should be able to easily combine logs
that they get from multiple companies.
Non-repudiation: When it comes to both data processing and sharing events it
should not be possible to later deny that the event took place.
Rectification & Erasure: It should be possible to rectify errors in the stored per-
sonal data and/or delete data at the request of the data subject.
Traceability: In the case of processing it should be possible to know about any
previous processing of the data. As such it should be possible to link events
in a manner that supports traceability of processing.
Ledger Robustness
Availability: Availability is the process of ensuring the optimal accessibility and
usability of the ledger irrespective of whether the log is stored locally or
globally. Here there is also a link to security as it is imperative that a breach
of security does not hinder ledger operations.
Local Log Global Log+ TTP
Global Log
+ P2P
Completeness - - -
Confidentiality MAC [2, 7, 14, 15],
FssAgg [10],
PKI [7, 10]
MAC [1, 6, 11, 12],
PKI [20],
unlinkability [6, 11, 12]
MAC [15],
PKI[16],
compound identities
[15, 21]
Correctness - - -
Immutability cipher chains [2],
hash chains [7, 15]
hash chains [7, 15] network of peers [16, 19]
blockchain [21]
Integrity forward integrity
[2, 7, 10, 14, 15]
MAC security proof [2]
forward integrity
[1, 6, 11, 12]
forward integrity [15]
Interoperability - - -
Non-repudiation - - -
Rectification & Erasure - - -
Traceability - event trails [20] -
Table 1. Candidate architectures and ledger functionality gap analysis
Local Log Global Log+ TTP
Global Log
+ P2P
Availability - - -
Performance logging & verification
[2, 7],
signature generation &
verification [10]
logging [11, 12],
throughput [11, 12]
-
Scalability encrypting records
[7, 10]
- -
Storage key & signature [10] resource restricted
devices [1]
-
Table 2. Candidate architectures and ledger robustness gap analysis
Performance: When it comes to the processing of the event data, various op-
timisations such as parallel processing and/or indexing should be used to
improve processing efficiency.
Scalability: Given the volume of events and policies that will need to be handled,
the scalability of event data processing is a major consideration.
Storage: In order to reduce the amount of information stored in the log, the data
itself should be stored elsewhere and only a hash of the data and a pointer
to the actual data itself should be stored in the ledger.
3 Candidate Transparency Ledgers
The overarching goal of this section is to examine the potential solutions pro-
posed in the literature in order to understand the strengths and limitations of
existing proposals and to identify challenges that still need to be addressed. A
summary of the degree of support offered by the candidate transparency archi-
tectures is provided in Table 1 and Table 2.
3.1 The Status Quo
When it comes to the persistence of provenance records there are three high
level options, that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: each company main-
tains a local ledger, which may be backed up remotely; a global ledger could
be maintained by one or more trusted third parties; or a global ledger could be
distributed across a number of peers.
Local ledger Each peer could store its provenance records locally, including
information pertaining to data sharing (both incoming and outgoing). While,
remote logging to a trusted third party (TTP) could be used to guarantee recov-
erability of data if the machine where the log is stored is compromised. Bellare
and Yee [2] and Schneier and Kelsey [15] demonstrated how a secret key sign-
ing scheme based on Message Authentication Codes (MACs) together with a
hashing algorithm can be used to generate chains of log records that are in turn
used to ensure log confidentiality and integrity. MACs are themselves symmet-
ric keys that are generated and verified using collision-resistant secure crypto-
graphic hash functions. Bellare and Yee [2] discuss how a MAC secret key signing
scheme together with evolving MAC keys (whereby each record is encrypted with
a different key that is derived from the old key) can be used to ensure: (i) the
confidentiality of the log; (ii) that previous log entries cannot be changed; and
that (iii) the deletion of a log entry can be detected. In such a scenario the base
MAC key, which is needed to verify the integrity of the log is entrusted to a TTP.
Schneier and Kelsey [15] also use MACs however the log is composed of hash
chains as oppose to cipher block chains. Whereas, Holt [7] propose an alternative
that combines public key cryptography with hash chains. These approaches are
further enhanced by Ma and Tsudik [10] who demonstrate how individual log
entry signatures can be combined into a single aggregate signature that can be
used to verify the component signatures and to protect against log truncation.
While the previously mentioned works focused on logging in general, Sackmann
et al. [14] apply it specifically to data protection by demonstrating how a secure
logging system can be used for privacy-aware logging. Additionally, they intro-
duce the "privacy evidence" concept and discuss how such a log could be used
to compare data processing to the users privacy policy.
When it comes to the robustness requirements, both Bellare and Yee [2] and
Holt [7] evaluate the performance and scalability of the proposed logging and
verification algorithms, while Ma and Tsudik [10] compare alternative signature
generation and verification algorithms.
Global Ledger and Trusted Third Party: Alternatively, the ledger may
contain provenance records that are maintained by one or more TTPs. Accorsi
[1] demonstrate how MAC-based secure logging mechanisms can be tailored so
that they can be used by resource restricted devices that may need to log data
remotely. Wouters et al. [20] highlight the fact that data often flows between
different processes, and as such events cannot be considered in isolation, thus
giving rise to the need to store a trail of events. The authors demonstrate how
public key cryptography can be used to log events in a manner whereby the
data subject can verify the process status. Hedbom et al. [6], Peeters et al.
[11], Pulls et al. [12] also provide logging mechanisms that provides transparency
to data subjects. The protocol, which is based on MAC secure logging techniques,
ensures confidentiality and unlinkability of events and is designed so that it can
be distributed across several servers. In the case of [11, 12], each log is composed
of a user block, a processor block and the encrypted data. A trusted third party
is responsible for generating the MAC, encrypting it with the users public key,
signing it with their own private key and sending it to the data subject via the
data processor. The data processor block is generated in a similar manner. Both
the log and the personal data are encrypted in a manner that only the data
subject and the processor can access them. In the case of data sharing a new
blinded public key is created (in a manner such that the data subjects private
key can decrypt any data encrypted with the blinded public key). The blinded
key, which will be used by the second data processor, also serves to ensure the
unlinkability of the logs.
Peeters et al. [11], Pulls et al. [12] both evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed algorithms and examine the logging throughput from a local and a remote
perspective. The authors conclude that encryption and signing are expensive op-
erations and as such the log entry generation time does not scale linearly with the
size of the logged data. They also highlight that the decryption and verification
processed are also expensive.
Global Ledger and Peer-to-Peer network: Alternatively, the ledger may be
distributed across several physical ledgers (i.e. a virtual global ledger), whereby
provenance records are replicated by each peer. Schneier and Kelsey [15] high-
light the vulnerability associated with using a single TTP and discuss how n
untrusted machines could be used to replace the TTP, with m untrusted ma-
chines required to reproduce the base MAC secret key. Weitzner et al. [19] also
discuss how transparency and accountability can be achieved via distributed
accountability peers that communicate using existing web protocols. These ac-
countability peers would be responsible for mediating access to data, maintaining
audit logs and facilitating accountability reasoning. Unfortunately the authors
only touch upon the required features and no concrete architecture is proposed.
Seneviratne and Kagal [16] build on this idea by describing how a distributed
network of peers can be used to store a permanent log of encrypted transactions.
The replication of log entries at each peer optimises both redundancy and avail-
ability. Although the authors describe how a distributed network of peers can be
used to store a permanent log of transactions, they focus primarily on helping
users to conform to policies by highlighting not only usage restrictions but also
the implications of their actions, as opposed to investigating the functional and
technical challenges of the proposed transparency architecture itself. An alterna-
tive distributed architecture based on blockchain technology, which can be used
to manage access to personal data is proposed by Zyskind et al. [21]. The authors
discuss how the blockchain data model and Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) can be extended to keep track of both data and access transactions. Data
that is encrypted using a shared encryption key, is sent to the blockchain, which
subsequently stores the data in an off-blockchain key value store and a pointer
to the data in the form of a hash in the public ledger. Compound identities are
used to ensure that only the user and service providers that have been granted
access to the data can decrypt the data. One of the primary drawbacks is the fact
that the authors focus on how to repurpose the blockchain as an access-control
moderator as opposed to exploring the suitability of the proposed architecture
for data transparency and governance.
In comparison to local or global approaches that employ a third party the
robustness of the proposed approaches has not been explored to date, therefore
it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of P2P ledgers or blockchains from a
non-functional perspective.
3.2 Gap Analysis
Although the main goal of the analysis was to investigate the opportunities and
the limitations of each of the candidate architectures, in the end we were able to
observe that the primary technical challenges are common across all candidate
architectures (cf. Table 1 & Table 2).
Correctness, Completeness & Non-Repudiation: Although both correctness and
completeness are very desirable features, irrespective of the choice of archi-
tecture, when it comes to data processing events neither can be guaranteed
as there is no way to prevent companies from logging incorrect information
or not entering the information into the log. Although fair exchange proto-
cols could potentially be used to ensure non-repudiation of data transactions
(i.e. neither party can deny the transaction took place), to date they have
not been used in connection with existing logging mechanisms.
Confidentiality & Integrity: The combination of MAC together with cipher or
hash chains appears to be the prevailing mechanism used to ensure the con-
fidentiality and forward integrity of logs. Although Schneier and Kelsey [15]
highlight that it could be feasible to replace the TTP with n untrusted ma-
chines whereby any m are required to reproduce the base MAC secret key,
no concrete details are provided. Additionally, in the context of our use case
the secure logging verification schemes would need to be extended to cater
for rectification & erasure without affecting the overall integrity of the log.
Immutability, Rectification & Erasure: Although it should not be possible for a
company to go back and reinvent history, the GDPR stipulates that data
subjects have the right to rectification & erasure (often referred to as the right
to be forgotten). This could potentially be seen as a hard delete whereby the
data needs to be erased from both the system and the logs. This would mean
that we need to be able to update and delete records from the log without
affecting the overall integrity of the log. One potential solution would be
to employ a cryptographic delete and to provide support for updates via
versioning.
Interoperability & Traceability: Another consideration is the interoperability of
the log with other logs. Considering that existing logging research has pri-
marily focused recording operating system and application events it is not
surprising that interoperability has received very little attention to date. Al-
though there has been some research on traceability, the focus has primarily
been on linking processing events in a single log.
Performance & Scalability: Considering the potential volume of events that will
need to be handled by the transparency ledger, the scalability of existing
logging mechanisms will be crucial to their adoption. When it comes to
the processing of event data, various optimisations such as parallel process-
ing and/or indexing may improve processing efficiency. Data transfer speed
could be improved via exchanging a compressed version of the data pay-
load. Inherently querying and updating logs over distributed databases is a
computational challenge.
Storage: In practice it may not be feasible for a single log server or each peer in
a distributed network to store all provenance records. One possibility is to
split the provenance records into multiple ledgers, distributed among TTPs
or peers. However, such an architecture would need to be fault tolerant in the
case of peers disconnecting from the network. Relevance criteria and careful
forgetting may help too, insofar as storage requirements may be reduced by
storing only the information that is needed for compliance checking in the
specific domain of interest, and deleting other information.
Availability: Clearly from an availability perspective it is important that the
best practices are employed in order to protect the security of the log host.
Additionally the log should be backed up to a secure location on a regular
basis. It is worth noting that when it comes to log recovery, rather than
relying on a TTP a hash of the log could be submitted to a publicly available
blockchain (such as Bitcoin). However, unlike trusted third parties public
blockchains do not come with Service Level Agreements (SLAs).
4 Challenges and Opportunities
Although in this paper we primarily focus on transparency, our long term goal
is to use the ledger together with access/usage policies in order to automatically
verify compliance of existing business processes with the GDPR, to this end it
is necessary to model both policies and events in a machine readable manner.
4.1 The Ledger
The Resource Description Framework (RDF), which underpins the Linked Data
Web (LDW), is used to represent and link information, in a manner which can
be interpreted by both humans and machines. Particularly, the power of RDF
is revealed in combination with agreed and extensible meta-data vocabularies
to describe provenance and events related to data records in a log as metadata,
in semantically unambiguous terms. By employing RDF techniques to represent
the provenance events stored in the ledger we shall be able to support not only
interoperabilily between ledgers, but also traceabiliy between events in a manner
that facilitates automatic compliance checking. To this end, there are a num-
ber of existing vocabularies that can be adapted/ extended. For example the
PROV 4 and OWL-Time5 ontologies can be used to represent provenance and
4 PROV,https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-overview/
5 OWL-Time,https://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time/
temporal information respectively. The former may require extensions of PROV
to model particular aspects related to processing of personal data. The latter
is particularly relevant if ledger-information is distributed. For example, when
tracking audit trails potentially distributed over different systems, synchronisa-
tion of timestamps and ensuring sequentiality are major issues. Apart from the
actual representation of time, reasoning and querying about time and temporal
aspects is still an issue that needs more research in the Semantic Web arena. Dif-
ferent proposals for temporal extensions of RDF and querying archived, temporal
information in RDF exist, cf. for instance [5] and references therein. Additionally
there exists a number of general event vocabularies such as the Event6 ontology
and the LODE7 ontology [13] that could potentially be adapted/extended in
order to model our data processing events.
An additional benefit of Linked Data is that it provides a simple, direct way
of associating policies with data. However, such integration needs to be done in a
way that ensures scalability. Several techniques can be exploited for this purpose.
As an example, we mention knowledge compilation approaches that "compile"
semantic metadata into a compact but self-contained policy that can be more
efficiently enforced, without any further access to the knowledge repository (cf.
the approaches based on partial evaluation in [3]). The usage of RDF and URIs
shall enable the deployment of a linked network of distributed ledgers instead of
a single, monolithic (central or P2P ledger). Here it would be interesting to look
into efforts for modularising and linking between distributed ledgers such as the
recent interledger protocol [8] proposal.
4.2 Ledger Integrity and Reliability
Ensuring the ledger’s integrity and reliability is of course essential for compliance
checking and for enhancing the subjects’ trust in the transparency architecture.
Reliability is partly the result of voluntary compliance. In the countries with
strong data protection regulations, due to the sanctions and the loss of rep-
utation and customers that may result from data abuse, data processors are
willing to comply with the regulations, and feel the need for technical means
to ensure compliance. In such scenarios, a correct and complete ledger is an ex-
tremely useful tool for the data processors, that can exploit it both for verifying
their internal procedures, and for demonstrating compliance to data subjects
and data protection authorities. This incentivises the creation and maintenance
of a correct and complete ledger. As a further incentive to correctness, the event
records should be signed by the parties involved in the recorded operation. In
this way, the ledger’s records become formal declarations that constitute evi-
dence with legal strength (in the countries where digital signatures have legal
value), that may be exploited in case of disputes. As a special case, some of the
ledger’s records may represent data usage consent declaration, in the form of a
usage policy signed by the data subject and the data processor. Such records are
6 Events,http://motools.sourceforge.net/event/event.html
7 LODE, http://linkedevents.org/ontology/
very close to a contract that none of the two parties can repudiate, due to the
properties of digital signatures.
Creating a reliable record for joint operations, and creating records with mul-
tiple “simultaneous” signatures, require the adoption of fair exchange protocols
to guarantee that the operation is completed (e.g. data are transferred) if and
only if all the involved parties sign the record and the record is included in
the ledger. An extensive survey of fair exchange protocols can be found in [9].
Ideally, the protocol should not involve centralised nodes such as TTP, but the
existing approaches of this kind, based on multiparty computations, currently do
not scale to the volume of data expected in the scenarios of interest. There are,
however, protocols with offline TTP, that involve the trusted third party only in
case of malfunctioning (like lost or corrupted messages) or protocol violations.
As of today, we regard such protocols as the most promising.
4.3 Immutability, Rectification & Erasure
When it comes to transparent personal data processing immutability is a very
desirable feature as it can be used by companies to prove that they have not gone
back and reinvented history. However, said immutability seems to be in direct
contention with the right to rectification and erasure according to the GDPR.
Considering the focus of this paper, we restrict our discussion to the rectification
and erasure of the log entries and do not give any special consideration to the
Line of Business (LOB) application. By only storing a hash of the data and a
pointer to the actual data itself in the ledger it is possible to decouple the data
from the log and indeed delete data. Another motivation for doing so is the
storage requirements can be reduced considerably. In the case of rectification it
may suffice to update data in the LOB application(s) and enter a new record in
the log indicating that the data was updated at the request of the data subject,
including a reference to the old – deleted – records hash that confirms that
said record was updated in mutual agreement. Likewise, in terms of erasure, we
assume that there are scenarios like rectification where it will suffice to delete
data from the LOB application(s) and enter a new record in the log indicating
that the data was deleted at the request of the data subject. Although this
would result in a dangling pointer from the initial log entry by following the
audit trail it would be possible to find out that the dangling pointer is the
result of an authorised delete. However, there may also be scenarios where delete
means a hard delete that needs to be propagated to the log (e.g., where it is
possible to identify the individual from the log entry). One option would be to
investigate the application of cryptographic deletes (where the old data should
not be available anymore) to the ledger. However, it would need to be possible
to distinguish between authorised deletes (at the request of the data subject)
and log tampering. As such, any delete or update request needs to be strongly
coupled with a request from the data subject. So far, cryptographic deletion has
been considered only in cloud computing environments, where files are replicated
across virtual and physical nodes, and whatever remains of the files after their
standard deletion (which is logical) could be later recovered by an attacker, cf.
[4, 17, 18]. We propose a novel use of cryptographic deletion as a means to
harmonise mandatory preservation requirements and the right to deletion, so as
to avoid extreme solutions where one requirement overrides the other.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Transparency with respect to the collection, processing and sharing of personal
data is a key enabler for data controllers and processors to achieve GDPR com-
pliance. In this paper, we identified several requirements that are important for
enabling transparent processing of personal data at scale. Following on from
this, we analysed a number of candidate logging mechanisms and discussed their
suitability in light of said requirements. Based on the gaps highlighted by this
analysis, we discussed some of the open challenges and opportunities for fu-
ture research. In particular we identified at least three interesting questions that
call for more work: how to ensure ledger interoperability and usage traceability
across organisation borders; how to obtain ledger integrity and reliability; and
how to reconcile the conflict between the log immutability requirement and the
data subjects’ right to rectification and erasure. In future work, we will develop
a system that enables data subjects to associate sticky usage policies with their
personal data and companies to demonstrate compliance both with the usage
policies specified by the data subject and obligations set forth in the GDPR.
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